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ABSTRACT 
Presentism is the view that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over only those 
objects temporally located at the present moment.  Nothing exists outside the present 
moment.  Eternalism is the view that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over objects 
in the past, present, and future.  No matter how remote an object’s temporal location, it 
still exists at the present moment. 
I argue the eternalist’s view forces him to make a distinction the presentist needs 
not.  The eternalist must admit that for an object to be temporally located at a time it must 
have a feature above and beyond mere existence at that time.  But discovering what 
feature differentiates the temporally local objects from the merely existing objects proves 
a difficult challenge.   
I claim, when we distinguish between the temporally local objects and the 
temporal distant objects, we appeal to whatever organizing principle holds between the 
space-time points that constitute the universe.  The question becomes what is the 
organizing principle between those points.   
I posit causation as that organizing principle.  I detail how causation must be 
characterized so that it may serve as that principle.  I defend my characterization of 
causation from the charge that it rules out manifestly possible circumstances.  And I 
respond to the objection that my view is unmotivated by the tenets of Humean 
reductionism and genuine modal realism.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers don’t agree on much.  But they agree that Socrates is a philosopher.  Ted 
Sider is too.  They agree that Socrates is Greek, while Sider is New Jerseyan.  They agree 
that Sider exists now.  Does Socrates?  Metaphysicians provide two competing answers. 
The first is presentism.  Presentism is the view that it is always the case that there 
are no non-present objects.1  Ned Markosian describes presentism this way: 
 
According to presentism, if we were to make an accurate list of the things that 
exist, i.e., a list of all the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over, 
there would not be a single non-present object on the list.  Thus, you and I and the 
Taj Mahal would be on the list, but neither Socrates nor any future grandchildren 
of mine would be included.2 
 
The second is non-presentism.  Non-presentism is the view that it is sometimes 
the case that there are some non-present objects.3  Markosian describes non-presentism 
this way: 
 
According to non-presentism, on the other hand, non-present objects like Socrates 
and my future grandchildren exist right now, even though they are not currently 
present.  We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they 
may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, 
but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things.4 
                                                 
1 Ned Markosian, “The 3D/4D Controversy and Non-present Objects,” Philosophical Papers 23 (1994):  3. 
 
2 Ned Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, ed. Dean W. Zimmerman, 
vol. 1 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-2. 
 
3 Markosian, “The 3D/4D Controversy,” 3. 
 
4 Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism,” 2. 
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The most influential form of non-presentism is eternalism.  Sider explains 
eternalism as follows: 
 
Time is like space regarding the reality of distant objects. Spatially distant objects, 
such as objects on Mars, are just as real as objects here on 
Earth...Likewise…temporally distant objects, such as dinosaurs, are just as real as 
objects we experience now...The view that temporally distant objects are real is 
sometimes called “eternalism.”5 
 
It seems to me that eternalism is the more reasonable view.  But Markosian claims 
presentism is the view the average person on the street would accept.6  Presentism does 
have some commonsense appeal.  Presentism appeals to common sense because it claims 
that our subjective experience of the passage of time tracks an objective feature of reality. 
According to presentism, from moment to moment, objects both come into and go 
out of existence.7  Only the space-time points that make up the present moment truly 
exist.  Those regions of space-time that are wholly past don’t exist anymore.  And those 
regions of space-time that are wholly future will not exist until they’ve become present.  
On presentism, time truly passes. 
Eternalism doesn’t give much metaphysical credence to our subjective experience 
of time. 8  In describing eternalism, Sider notes: 
 
                                                 
5 Theodore Sider, “Temporal Parts,” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, ed. John Hawthorne et al. 
(Oxford:  Blackwell, Forthcoming), 3. 
 
6 Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism,” 2. 
 
7 To be perfectly accurate, only instantaneous objects come into and go out of existence.  Enduring objects 
remain in existence from moment to moment. 
 
8 I use “eternalism” here as synonymous with the B-theory of time. 
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Time is like space regarding the relativity of here and now…What is called “here” 
changes depending upon who is using the word…According to some, the word 
“now” works analogously…There is no one true now.9 
 
According to eternalism, our experience of time tracks nothing in reality.  There is 
no one true present moment, and time does not pass.  Without the steady advance of the 
objective present, how could it? 
When it comes to engaging our common sense, presentism has the advantage.  
But committing to presentism comes with some liabilities.  We talk about, and seem to 
quantify over, non-present objects all the time.    For instance, how can we now say, 
“Socrates was a philosopher,” without referring to the non-present Socrates? 
The eternalist has no problem now referring to the non-present Socrates because, 
according to the eternalist, Socrates exists, and hence vacuously exists now.  But while 
the eternalist may quantify over non-present objects, the presentist must employ primitive 
sentence operators.10 
On eternalism, “Socrates was a philosopher,” is true iff Socrates exists and is a 
philosopher at some time t earlier than now.  On presentism, “Socrates was a 
philosopher,” is true simply in virtue of the primitive past-tense operator.   
On presentism, “Socrates is a philosopher,” is false, since at the present moment 
Socrates neither exists nor is a philosopher.11  But, “Socrates was a philosopher,” is true, 
not because of any properties Socrates possesses (he doesn’t exist to possess any), but 
                                                 
9 Sider, “Temporal Parts,” 3. 
 
10 Theodore Sider, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment,” The Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999):  1-2. 
 
11 When I here say, “Socrates is a philosopher,” I am using the present-tensed “is,” not the tenseless “is.”   
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simply because of the operator.  In order to vindicate our intuitions about past-and-future-
tensed sentences, the presentist must rely on his primitive temporal operators.   
When it comes to specifying the truth conditions of sentences, eternalism has the 
advantage.  The eternalist is not committed to the primitive temporal operators that the 
presentist must endorse.  But does eternalism really carry the day when it comes to 
economy of primitives?  To clarify the issue, let’s look at a poor argument against 
eternalism. 
 
THE PUZZLE OF TEMPORAL LOCATION 
Recall that, according to eternalism, both Socrates and Sider exist now.  Socrates is 
Greek, while Sider is New Jerseyan.  If I get in my car and drive to Jersey, I bet, if I look 
hard enough, I’ll be able to find Sider.  If I get on a plane and fly to Greece, I bet I won’t 
have the same luck finding Socrates.   
Of course, this isn’t a convincing argument.  When eternalists say that Socrates 
exists now, they are not implying that we can fly to Greece and find Socrates.  We all 
agree that Socrates is not in the same space-time vicinity that we are in right now.  But 
even from this poor argument, we can glean a kernel of truth.  There is a distinction the 
eternalist must make.  Markosian defines it as follows: 
 
Let us distinguish between two senses of ‘x exists now’. In one sense, which we 
can call the temporal-location sense, this expression is synonymous with ‘x is 
present’. The non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal-location sense of ‘x 
exists now’, it is true that no non-present objects exist right now. But in the other 
sense of ‘x exists now’, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that x 
exists now is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted 
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quantifiers, whether it happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like 
Socrates.12   
 
Given this distinction, the eternalist can truly say that both Socrates and Sider exist now 
in the ontological sense.  But only Sider exists now in the temporal-location sense.  
Socrates is not temporally local to now. 
The distinction between the ontological and temporal-location senses of existence 
is not one the presentist has to make.  Even if the presentist were to make such a 
distinction, it would collapse upon itself.  Recall that presentism is the view that only 
present objects are in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers.  For the presentist, 
saying that x is in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers is saying that x is 
present.  For the presentist, to say that ‘x exists now’ in the ontological sense is to say that 
‘x exists now’ in the temporal-location sense and vice versa.13   
But for the eternalist, making the distinction between the ontological and 
temporal-location senses of existence is essential.  The eternalist holds that Socrates 
exists now.  That means that, at this present moment, Socrates is within the domain of our 
                                                 
12 Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism,” 2. 
 
13 I have argued that the presentist does not need to make a distinction between the ontological and 
temporal-location senses of existence because, for the presentist, the set of things that exist in the 
ontological sense at any given moment and the set of things that exist in the temporal-location sense at that 
moment are always coextensive.  To me, it seems that, once one realizes that Hesperus and Phosphorus 
denote the same object, to posit a distinction between them is to multiply meanings beyond necessity.  But 
the eternalist might object that, if the presentist does not posit a distinction between the two senses of 
existence, then by the presentist’s lights, his own view is trivially true, and the eternalist’s is trivially false.  
If, by the presentist’s lights, eternalism is trivially false, how can there be an interesting disagreement 
between the two positions?  How can there be a real dispute?  But it seems that, as a result of the presentist 
refusing the distinction between the ontological and temporal-location senses of existence, a real dispute 
arises, namely whether ‘exist’ has two readings.  For the presentist, “Socrates exists now, but he doesn’t 
exist now,” is an abominable conjunction.  For the eternalist, that same sentence is perfectly acceptable, 
because ‘exist’ has two readings.  It seems that, if the presentist refuses the distinction, there is still a 
genuine dispute. 
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most unrestricted quantifiers.  If this were also to mean that Socrates is present, the 
consequences for eternalism are disastrous.  The poor argument against eternalism above 
is no longer poor at all.  If there is no distinction between the ontological and temporal-
location senses of existence, then presuming Socrates exists, we should be able to go to 
Greece and find him.   
How then is the eternalist to make sense of this distinction?  At this moment (let’s 
call it time t), lots of things exist.  There are a vast number of things that exist in the 
ontological sense at t.  We can imagine making a huge list with a notation for each of 
these things.  Now, if we make a list of all the things that exist in the temporal-location 
sense at t, this second list will be a sub-list of all the things that exist in the ontological 
sense at t. 
It seems there must be some feature that those things on the second list have that 
the things solely on the first list lack.  For something to exist in the temporal-location 
sense at t requires it to have some feature lacked by those things that merely exist in the 
ontological sense at t.  What might that feature be?  The demand to explain this feature 
poses a problem for eternalism, and it is a problem with no easy answer. 
 
A WEALTH OF SYNONYMY 
There are a number of quick-fixes we might employ to analyze the feature had by those 
things that exist in the temporal-location sense at a given moment but lacked by those 
things that merely exist in the ontological sense at that moment.  But none of these easy 
Gabriel, John J., 2007, UMSL, p. 10 
explanations is ultimately satisfying.  When one takes a closer look at any of these quick-
fix solutions, he is led right back to where he started.   
The first of these solutions has already been suggested in the quotes from 
Markosian above.  The feature is present-ness.  Those things that exist in the temporal-
location sense at a given moment t are present at t.  Those things that merely exist in the 
ontological sense at t are not.  But this is an empty explanation.  It leads one to wonder 
what feature those things that exist and are present at t have over those things that merely 
exist at t.  One seems led to answer that those things that exist and are present at t exist in 
the temporal-location sense at t, while those things that merely exist at t exist only in the 
ontological sense at t.14   
Another obvious failure is to claim that the feature is temporal location.  Those 
things that exist in the temporal-location sense at a given moment t are temporally located 
at t.  Those things that merely exist in the ontological sense at t are not.  Again, one can 
ask what feature those things that exist and are temporally located at t have over those 
things that merely exist at t.  And the answer seems to be that those things that exist and 
are temporally located at t exist in the temporal-location sense at t (or are present at t) 
while those things that merely exist at t exist only in the ontological sense at t (or exist 
and are non-present at t). 
                                                 
14 Here, I am not taking “being present at t” to be a primitive property possessed by all and only those 
objects that exist in the temporal-location sense at t.  If present-ness were such a primitive, it would be 
illegitimate for me to reject it as a solution to the puzzle by noting that it cannot be analyzed.  Similar 
remarks apply for taking “being temporally located at t” or “existing in the temporal-location sense at t” as 
primitive.  Claiming such properties are primitive is essentially claiming that temporal location is primitive.  
And I discuss this response later in the paper.   
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Yet a third failure is to claim that the feature is that they are in the domain of our 
quantifiers when those quantifiers are restricted to t.  Those things that exist in the 
temporal-location sense at a given moment t fall within the domain of our quantifiers 
when those quantifiers are restricted to t.  Those things that merely exist in the 
ontological sense at t are merely in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers.  On 
the face of it, one might think that this is a satisfactory explanation.  No more needs to be 
said on the issue.  But in truth, this reply does not suffice.   
Consider what is meant by restricted quantification.  Restricted quantification is 
quantification over some set d’, which is a proper subset of some given set d.15  Imagine 
we start by quantifying over the set of all people.  Then, we restrict our quantifiers so that 
now only men are in their domain.  With our quantifiers restricted, we are quantifying 
over the set of men that is a subset of the set of people.  In this case, it makes perfect 
sense to conclude that men share a feature or features that non-men lack.  It makes 
perfect sense to ask what that feature or those features might be.  And this is the very sort 
of question I pose when I ask what feature do those things that exist in the temporal-
location sense at a given moment have that those things that merely exist in the 
ontological sense at that moment lack.   
Claiming the feature is that they are in the domain of our quantifiers when those 
quantifiers are restricted to t does not explain the feature.  It takes us again to the usual 
question.  What feature do those things that fall within the domain of our quantifiers 
                                                 
15 Steven F. Savitt, “Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective,” paper presented to the Philosophy of Time 
Society Meeting, Chicago, IL, March 2004, 8. 
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when those quantifiers are restricted to t have over those things that are merely in the 
domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers?  One cannot answer by appealing to present-
ness, temporal location, or existence in the temporal-location sense.  And now, our easy 
answers are used up.  The mystery remains.  A satisfactory analysis of temporal location 
is required. 
 
ONE MORE OBVIOUS SOLUTION & WHY IT FAILS 
There is another obvious candidate for the feature that those objects that are temporally 
located at a given moment have that those objects that merely exist at that moment lack.  
But properly exploring it requires a discussion of the way objects persist through time.   
The two most influential views of how objects persist through time are 
perdurantism and endurantism, which Markosian takes to be synonymous with four-
dimensionalism and three-dimensionalism.16  He defines perdurantism and endurantism 
this way: 
Perdurantism:  Any object that exists at different times has different temporal 
parts at the different moments at which it exists.17   
 
Endurantism:  Any object that exists at different times is wholly present at each 
moment at which it exists.18   
 
                                                 
16 Markosian, “The 3D/4D Controversy,” 1. 
 
17 Ibid., 2. 
 
18 Ibid., 1. 
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Assuming perdurantism, perhaps the feature is having a temporal part.  Those 
things that are temporally located at a given moment t have a temporal part at t, while 
those things that merely exist at t do not have a temporal part at t.   
Assuming endurantism, perhaps the feature is being wholly present.  Those things 
that are temporally located at a given moment t are wholly present at t, while those things 
that merely exist at t are not.   
But before exploring whether having a temporal part or being wholly present at a 
given time explains something’s being temporally located at that time, we must consider 
Markosian’s remarks on the 3D/4D debate and the distinction between the temporal-
location and ontological senses of existence.  Markosian reinforces the need for the 
distinction between the temporal-location and ontological senses of existence.  He puts it 
as follows: 
 
The parties to the temporal dispute [must] agree that ‘x exists’ and ‘x is present’ are 
not synonymous – non-presentists in order to ensure that their claim is not trivially 
false, and presentists in order to ensure that their claim is not trivially true.  Once the 
two parties accept that ‘x exists’ and ‘x is present’ are not synonymous, they can 
agree that their dispute is over the question of whether these two expressions are 
always co-extensive.19 
 
Here, Markosian has rephrased the distinction between the temporal-location and 
ontological senses of existence, referring to it as the distinction between present-ness and 
existence.  Given this rephrased distinction, Markosian proceeds to note that the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 3. 
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definitions of perdurantism and endurantism described above entail that non-presentism 
is trivially false.20  They force us to deny eternalism.   
Recall that perdurantism as defined above is the view that any object that exists at 
different times has different temporal parts at the different moments at which it exists.  
Given perdurantism and eternalism, if Socrates exists now, then he has a temporal part 
now.  This would entail that a temporal part of Socrates is a present object and would 
lead to all the problems Socrates’s being a present object creates.   
Endurantism, as formulated above, is in the same boat.  Recall that endurantism 
was defined as the view that any object that exists at different times is wholly present at 
each moment at which it exists.  Again, given endurantism and eternalism, if Socrates 
exists now, then he is wholly present now.  This too would entail that Socrates is a 
present object and would lead to all the problems Socrates’s being a present object 
creates.   
Markosian solves this problem by modifying the definitions of perdurantism and 
endurantism.  Relying on these revised formulations, one can accept either perdurantism 
or endurantism without committing oneself to presentism.  His corrected versions of 
perdurantism and endurantism are as follows: 
Perdurantism (revised):  Any object that is present at different times has different 
temporal parts at the different moments at which it is present.21 
   
Endurantism (revised):  Any object that is present at different times is wholly 
present at each moment at which it is present.22   
                                                 
20 Ibid., 4. 
 
21 Ibid., 5. 
 
22 Ibid. 
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In essence, Markosian has applied the distinction between the temporal-location 
and ontological senses of existence to the definitions of perdurantism and endurantism.  
As Markosian notes, if the notion of existence used in the definitions of perdurantism and 
endurantism is understood in the ontological sense, then accepting either view renders 
eternalism false.  If, on the other hand, the notion of existence used in the definitions of 
perdurantism and endurantism is understood in the temporal-location sense, eternalism is 
spared.  What Markosian has shown is that the eternalist must understand perdurantism 
and endurantism in terms of the temporal-location sense of existence in order for his view 
to be coherent.  This means that the eternalist cannot rely on his notion of perdurantism 
or endurantism to provide a satisfactory analysis of temporal location because the 
eternalist’s concepts of perdurantism and endurantism rely on the notion of temporal 
location.   
Note that it is not just Markosian’s formulations of the views that rest on the 
notion of temporal location.  Sider defines 4D-ism/perdurantism as the view that, given a 
set of moments the union of which is the time span of x, x has a temporal part at each 
moment in the set.23  By “the time span of x,” Sider seems to mean the moments at which 
x exists.  But does Sider mean the moments at which x exists in the ontological sense or 
the temporal-location sense?  If the time span of x is to be understood as the moments at 
which x exists in the ontological sense, then Sider’s formulation too entails that, if x 
exists now, x is a present object.  The only way for Sider to avoid this consequence is to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
23 Theodore Sider, “Four Dimensionalism,” The Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 7. 
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accept that the time span of x is to be understood as the moments at which x exists in the 
temporal-location sense.  But this means that Sider’s formulation too rests on the notion 
of temporal location.  Thus, Sider’s notion of perdurantism is likewise useless for 
providing an analysis of temporal location. 
With these considerations out of the way, we return to our original question and 
our most recent candidate to answer it.  What feature do those objects that are temporally 
located at a given moment have that those objects that merely exist at that moment lack?  
Assuming perdurantism, is the feature having a temporal part?  Assuming endurantism, is 
the feature being wholly present?  
It seems whether or not being temporally located at a given time t can be analyzed 
in terms of having a temporal part or being wholly present at t depends on how one 
defines having a temporal part and being wholly present.  Markosian, his formulations 
inspired by Sider, gives the following account of having a temporal part and being wholly 
present: 
 
x is a temporal part of y at t =df (i) x exists only at t; (ii) x is a part of y at t; and 
(iii) x overlaps everything that is a part of y at t.24  
 
x is wholly present at t =df (i) x is present at t and (ii) it’s not the case that there is 
a y such that y is a temporal part of x at some time other than t.25 
 
In order to see whether these definitions can provide a satisfactory analysis of 
temporal location, consider first the definition of a temporal part.  According to the 
definition, if something has a temporal part at a given time t, then it has a part that exists 
                                                 
24 Markosian, “The 3D/4D Controversy,” 6. 
 
25 Ibid. 
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only at t.  But what kind of existence are we talking about here?  Does the part exist only 
at t in the ontological sense, or does the part exist only at t in the temporal-location sense?  
In order for eternalism to be coherent, the part must exist only at t in the temporal-
location sense. 
Presumably, the perdurantist eternalist wants to claim that Socrates does not have 
a temporal part at the present moment.  But he also wants to claim that Socrates is merely 
an amalgam, a mereological sum, of his temporal parts.  If each of Socrates’s temporal 
parts only falls within the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers at its one particular 
moment and Socrates is only the combination of his temporal parts, then, since Socrates 
does not have a temporal part now, he is not within the domain of our most unrestricted 
quantifiers now.  Socrates does not exist now.  But of course, this is the very opposite of 
what the perdurantist eternalist wants to claim. 
The perdurantist eternalist must claim that to have a temporal part at t is to have a 
part that is temporally located only at t.  But this means that the definition of temporal 
part relies on the notion of temporal location.  It is useless for providing an analysis of 
temporal location. 
Recall that we were hoping to understand what it was for an object to be 
temporally located at a moment t in terms of its having a temporal part at t.  But as has 
been shown, in order to understand properly what it is for an object to have a temporal 
part, we must understand what it is for that temporal part to be temporally located at its 
particular moment.  Thus the notion of a temporal part cannot help us find an analysis of 
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temporal location.  The notion of a temporal part relies on the notion of temporal 
location. 
Turning to the definition of the wholly present, the definition includes both the 
notion of present-ness and the notion of a temporal part.26  For these reasons, an 
endurantist eternalist cannot rely on the notion of something’s being wholly present at a 
given moment t in order to explain that thing’s being temporally located at t.   
Given the above formulations, one cannot analyze temporal location in terms of 
having a temporal part or being wholly present. But might one be able to redefine these 
concepts so as to make them useful for providing such an analysis? 
It seems possible that one can redefine having a temporal part and being wholly 
present in a way that does not rely on the notion of temporal location, but I have not 
discovered any such formulations myself.  Moreover, I expect such definitions will prove 
quite hard to find.  Any satisfactory definition of temporal part-hood needs to be 
formulated in such a way that a given temporal part cannot be instantiated in more than 
one moment.  Each temporal part must be bound to one particular moment.  In order to 
enforce this constraint, any satisfactory definition of temporal part-hood must require that 
a given temporal part be temporally located only at one particular moment.  It seems very 
difficult to divorce the concept of temporal part-hood from the notion of temporal 
location. 
                                                 
26 Of course, the endurantist denies outright that any object has any temporal parts, but Markosian’s 
definition of wholly present includes the notion of a temporal part in order to specify what it is the 
endurantist denies that any object has. 
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It does seem that one could easily define being wholly present without relying on 
the notion of temporal part-hood.  But it seems much more difficult to define being 
wholly present without relying on the notion of being present.  And since one cannot 
analyze temporal location in terms of any concept that relies on present-ness, analyzing it 
in terms of being wholly present seems doomed to failure.   
Still, I leave it as an open question whether or not a formulation of having a 
temporal part or being wholly present can be found that could analyze the notion of 
temporal location. 
 
IS PRESENTISM THE SOLUTION? 
On the face of it, eternalism has a problem.  Recall that, according to eternalism, in order 
for a present utterance of, “Socrates was a philosopher,” to be true, there must be a time 
earlier than now at which Socrates is located and at which Socrates is a philosopher.  But 
we have no obvious way of explaining what it is for Socrates to be located at a time 
earlier than now.  We have no obvious way of explaining what it is for Socrates to be 
located at any time whatsoever. 
Of course, we can simply claim that temporal location is primitive.  The space-
time points that constitute the universe have some kind of unanalyzable organization.  So, 
when we ask what it is for an object to be located at a time, we ask a trivial question, one 
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answered simply by appealing to the primitive location of the points that constitute the 
object.27   
But this very reply creates a problem for eternalism.  Recall that one of the major 
liabilities of presentism was that it required the presentist to be committed to primitive 
temporal operators.  But if the eternalist must take temporal location as primitive, then 
eternalism too must license questionable primitives.  Eternalism has both the unpalatable 
commitment to the position that time does not pass and to irreducible temporal location.   
The eternalist is seemingly faced with a dilemma.  He must posit a distinction 
between an object’s merely existing at a time and that object’s being temporally located 
at that time.  To do so, the eternalist must either provide an analysis of temporal location 
or take temporal location as primitive.  To provide an analysis of temporal location, the 
eternalist must explain the feature that temporally local objects have that merely existing 
objects lack.  But there is no obvious explanation of the feature that is not itself 
synonymous with nor does it rely on the notion of temporal location.  Moreover, taking 
temporal location as primitive forces us to give up the logical economy of primitives that 
seemed to motivate eternalism over presentism. 
Is presentism then the solution?  Should we simply give up eternalism and accept 
presentism?28  The presentist is not required to make a distinction between an object’s 
existing at a time and that object’s being temporally located at that time.  For the 
                                                 
27 Of course, my discussion of temporal location in terms of the organization of space-time points would 
most appeal to perdurantists who take objects to be sets of space-time points. 
 
28 Although they would tie when it comes to economy of primitives, overall, presentism would win over 
eternalism because presentism, unlike eternalism, upholds our intuition that time passes. 
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presentist, one sense of existence is enough.  But before we tell the eternalists to clean out 
their desks, there is more to consider.  A similar problem to the temporal-location puzzle 
is lurking for both the presentist and the eternalist, but seeing the problem requires a bit 
of a digression.   
The debate between presentism and eternalism as regards time mirrors the debate 
between actualism and genuine modal realism as regards modality.29  Markosian defines 
actualism as the view that, necessarily, there are no non-actual objects.30  He defines 
genuine modal realism as the view that, necessarily there are some non-actual objects.31  
Actualism is the analog of presentism.  Genuine modal realism is the analog of 
eternalism. 
As we have seen, presentism takes existence in its broadest sense to be existence 
at the present moment.  On presentism, only objects local to the present moment exist.  
Eternalism must take existence in its broadest sense (the ontological sense) to be distinct 
from existence at a moment (the temporal-location sense).  On eternalism, both 
temporally distant and temporally local objects exist.  But only temporally local objects 
are temporally located at the present moment.  The challenge for the eternalist is finding a 
satisfactory analysis of what beyond mere existence at a moment is required to be 
temporally local to that moment. 
                                                 
29 Sider, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment,” 1. 
 
30 Markosian, “The 3D/4D Controversy,” 2. 
 
31 Ibid. 
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For the actualist, existence in its broadest sense is equivalent to being a part of the 
actual world.  According to actualism, only actual objects exist.  But for the genuine 
modal realist, a multitude of non-actual objects exist.  How does the genuine modal 
realist distinguish those objects that are actual from those objects that are merely 
possible? 
Consider that, for the genuine modal realist, “actual” is an indexical.  The actual 
world is whatever world in which the speaker happens to be located.  There is no 
objectively actual world.  In our world, Ted Sider is a philosopher, but he could have 
been a soccer player.  According to the genuine modal realist, in our world, both Sider 
the philosopher and Sider the soccer player exist, but only Sider the philosopher is actual.  
Is there any explanation of the feature Sider the philosopher has that Sider the soccer 
player lacks that is not itself synonymous with nor does it rely on the notion of being 
actual? 
David Lewis provides an answer.  Lewis claims that, at our world, the feature that 
Sider the philosopher has that Sider the soccer player lacks is that Sider the philosopher is 
spatiotemporally related to us.32  More specifically, every particular part of Sider is 
spatiotemporally related to every particular part of you and me.  According to Lewis, this 
makes us worldmates.  And since “actual” is an indexical, all that is required to determine 
the actual objects at our world is to determine our worldmates.   
                                                 
32 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford:  Blackwell, 1986), 70. 
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However, Lewis’s answer requires us to know what it is for an object to be 
spatiotemporally located at a given place and time.  And this is the very question we were 
trying to pursue when we looked to the debate between actualism and genuine modal 
realism for inspiration.  Either Lewis must take spatial and temporal location to be 
primitive, or he must provide an analysis of it in order to make sense of his conditions for 
being worldmates.  
If the genuine modal realist is not allowed to rely on the notion of spatiotemporal 
location to individuate worlds, then he is left with an analog to the temporal-location 
puzzle.  Existence by itself does not entail actuality.  Thus, there must be some feature 
that actual objects have that merely existing objects lack, and (if we disallow an 
explanation that relies on spatiotemporal location) an explanation of what that feature is 
proves hard to find.   
So, as we have seen, as much as there is a debate between presentism and 
eternalism as regards time, there is a debate between actualism and genuine modal 
realism as regards modality.  One could simply say that now we should become actualist 
presentists and thus do away with these problems of temporal and modal location 
altogether.   
But this reaction is too hasty.  Consider the underlying similarities of the 
aforementioned temporal and modal debates.  Both the presentist and the actualist claim 
that to exist at all is to be local.  The eternalist and the genuine modal realist claim that 
things do exist that are not local.  It seems that an analog to the presentism/eternalism, 
temporal debate and the actualism/realism, modal debate can be created for space as well.   
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We can image two views, spatial presentism and spatial realism.  For the spatial 
presentist, nothing exists beyond that which is here, i.e., that which is local to this 
particular region of space.  For the spatial realist, there is a distinction between existing in 
the broadest sense and existing here.   
To clarify, consider that, at the moment, I am typing in my office in Saint Louis.  
My brother is watching television in Green Bay.  Still, here in my office, my brother 
exists.  My brother falls within the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers.  But my 
brother is not here in my office.  He is not within these four walls.  Here in my office, 
there is some feature that I have that my brother lacks.  There is some feature that those 
objects that are present in my office have that those objects that merely exist in my office 
lack.   
Both my brother and I exist in my office.  We are both in the domain of our most 
unrestricted quantifiers.  We just don’t both occupy the same sufficiently small spatial 
region, the region that comprises my office.  But how do we distinguish between those 
existing objects that are local to the small spatial region that is my office and those that 
aren’t?  We must posit a feature that the objects in my office have that the objects outside 
of my office lack.  Again, we are left with the same old question.  What might that 
feature be? 
Again, there is no easy answer.  Being present in my office, being here in my 
office, being local to my office, and being such that with our quantifiers restricted to my 
office it still falls within the domain of our quantifiers all seem synonymous.  Moreover, 
it seems that an appeal to the fact that my physical body is in my office will have to rest 
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on the notion of being present in or being local to my office.  It does not seem that there 
is a satisfactory analysis of spatial location either.   
It seems that we have three concepts, modality, time, and space, for which we can 
construct analogous debates.  At issue is the question of whether existence entails being 
local or whether existence extends beyond the local.  If one claims that existence extends 
beyond the local in every case, he commits himself to realism about merely possible 
objects, non-present objects, and spatially distant objects.  If one claims that existence 
entails being local in every case, he commits himself to actualism, presentism, and the 
view that everything exists within some sufficiently small spatial region.   
Whether the kind of extreme presentism described in the latter case is even 
coherent, it is certainly not a view that anyone would hold.  So while there are 
philosophers who take modality, time, and space to be extended, there are none that take 
modality, time, and space to entail being local.  Everyone is a spatial realist.   
This means that, if the presentist must take spatial location as primitive, he can 
hardly begrudge the eternalist for taking spatiotemporal location as primitive as well.  But 
perhaps we do not need to throw up our hands and admit that spatiotemporal location is 
irreducible.  To find an analysis of spatiotemporal location, we must begin by asking 
ourselves some simple questions. 
 
ORGANIZING SPACE-TIME 
What do we mean when we ask what is it for an object to be located at a time?  If we’re 
eternalists, we take time to be an extended manifold of space-time points.  If we’re 
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presentists, we take time to be a momentary slice of space-time points.  On eternalism, 
when we say that Socrates merely exists at t, we’re saying that, no matter whether and 
how we may choose to restrict our quantifiers, Socrates always falls within the domain of 
our most unrestricted quantifiers. 
On eternalism, when we say that Socrates is located at t, we are really saying a 
number of things:  1) We’re restricting our quantifiers to some subset of existing space-
time points, which falls within the domain of all existing space-time points.  2) We’re 
calling this subset of points that our restricted quantifiers range over “the moment t,” and 
3) we’re claiming that some or all of the space-time points that constitute the object 
Socrates are a part of t; that is, the points that make up Socrates are among the points that 
fall within the domain of our restricted quantifiers.   
On presentism, we don’t have an extended manifold of space-time points.  All we 
have is one moment or time-slice of points.  When we ask what is it for Socrates to be 
present at the moment t (to be located at t), we are not restricting our quantifiers to a 
subset of existing space-time points, falling within the domain of all existing space-time 
points.  When we ask what it is for Socrates to be present at t, we leave our quantifiers 
wide open.  For Socrates to be present at t is merely for the space-time points that 
constitute Socrates to fall within the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers.  For the 
presentist, there is no difference between existence at a time and existence simpliciter.   
But for the eternalist, there is a difference.  On eternalism, there is a distinction 
between those things that are temporally located at a time and those things that merely 
exist at that time.  On eternalism, when we ask what feature or features does Socrates 
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(who is located at t) have that Sider (who merely exists at t) lacks, again we ask a number 
of things:  1) We ask what it is about the points that constitute Socrates that make them a 
part of the set of points that make up t.  2) We ask what it is about the points that 
constitute Sider such that they are not part of the set of points that make up t.  3) We ask 
what feature differentiates the space-time points that fall within the domain of our 
quantifiers when they are restricted to t from those points that do not fall within that 
domain. 
In essence, eternalism assumes, we have a nicely arranged, well organized 
manifold of space-time points.  When we restrict our quantifiers in order to talk about a 
moment of time, we’re picking out a subset, a time-slice, of all the moments in that 
manifold.  The question is what is the organizing principle, if any, behind that manifold.33   
In order to help us get a grip on the project we’re undertaking, it may be useful if 
we envision all the points of space-time as a collection of beads.  We can imagine the 
organizing principle behind the space-time points as strings that connect them.  Much as 
all the space-time points are connected by this organizing principle, all the beads are 
connected to one another by strings.  Now, if we pull the strings tight, what would have 
been a disorganized mess of beads becomes nicely arranged into a manifold.  There is a 
place for every point, and every point is in its place.   
                                                 
33 In what follows, I attempt to analyze the organizing principle behind the space-time points that comprise 
the universe.  In providing an account of how the space-time points that comprise the universe are arranged, 
I provide an account of the spatiotemporal location of and the spatiotemporal relations between the objects 
the points comprise.  I do not attempt to analyze space-time itself.  I take the existence of the space-time 
points to be primitive in the same way I take the existence of the objects that the points comprise to be 
primitive.  The space-time points simply fall within the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, and 
that is all I intend to say on the issue.   
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If we take spatiotemporal location as primitive, we’re essentially claiming that 
there is some unanalyzable organization to the space-time points that constitute the 
universe.  When we quantify over a part of the space-time manifold, we are able to take 
the organization of the manifold for granted.  We are able to rely on the organization of 
the manifold as a way of differentiating between those points that our restricted 
quantifiers range over and those that they don’t.   
If we refuse to take spatiotemporal location as primitive, then we have to devise 
some means of organizing the space-time points that constitute the universe.  Our 
challenge becomes taking our disorganized collection of points and finding some way of 
arranging them into the proper manifold without relying on primitive spatiotemporal 
location.   
Imagine again that the space-time points that make up the universe are 
represented by beads.  If we take spatiotemporal location as primitive, then we have 
strings to connect the beads, and thus it is easy to arrange properly our beads into their 
manifold structure.  But if we refuse to take spatiotemporal location as primitive, then if 
we have all of the space-time points that exist simpliciter, we know nothing about how 
they are arranged.  All we have is a disorganized pile of beads.   
Without primitive spatiotemporal location, we must find some other way of 
connecting our objects, a way that nonetheless allows us to arrange the objects in the 
same structure in which they would have been arranged had we taken spatiotemporal 
location as primitive.  We must take our beads and arrange them in the same way as 
before, without relying on the irreducible-organizing-principle strings to connect them.   
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The search for a principle by which to organize the points in space-time leads us 
to another simple question.  Why am I here?  Or rather, why are the space-time points of 
which I am comprised adjacent to the space-time points to which they are adjacent?  
Right now, I am in my office typing a philosophy paper.  If you were to ask me why I am 
in my office, my commonsense reply would be that I’m in my office because awhile ago 
I walked into my office.  It seems there is something about my past state that caused my 
current state.  Causation seems to govern the arrangement of the objects in space and 
time. 
So, our commonsense understanding of what makes an object where it is seems to 
be that an object is where it is now because it was caused to be there by some other object 
in the past.  Perhaps, the causal relations between space-time points can be used to 
organize those points into the proper manifold arrangement.  The question then becomes 
how we characterize these causal relations so that they allow us to arrange their relata 
into the proper manifold structure.   
It may help to focus on a single causal relation rather than a whole universe full of 
them.  Or rather, it may help if we focus on a universe containing only two objects.  
Imagine two points in space-time P and Q.  P causes Q.  And if we were to take 
spatiotemporal location as primitive, our universe would be organized such that Q occurs 
one moment after P.  But without primitive spatiotemporal location, we only have P, Q, 
and the fact that P causes Q.  We have to characterize the causal relation between P and 
Q in such a way that P and Q must as a consequence of their causal connection be 
organized in a certain way relative to one another.   
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How then are we to characterize this causal relation?  In order for causation to 
allow us to provide an analysis of spatiotemporal location, we must first say that P and Q 
share a necessary connection and that one of the consequences of that connection is that 
the space-time point that constitutes P is arranged in a certain way relative to the space-
time point that constitutes Q.  In this case, they are adjacent.  “P causes Q,” should be 
taken to mean that, necessarily, P exists iff Q exists and, necessarily, where P and Q 
exist, P is arranged in a certain way relative to Q.34   Essentially, we are grounding non-
modal facts, i.e., facts about spatiotemporal location, in terms of modal facts, i.e., 
causation understood as a necessary connection between objects/space-time points.   
So, returning to our P-and-Q universe, if we took spatiotemporal location as 
primitive, our universe would consist of two objects P and Q.  It would span two 
moments.  And P would be temporally located at the first moment, while Q would be 
temporally located at the second.  Now, denying that spatiotemporal location is primitive, 
our universe still consists of two objects P and Q.  If P causes Q in the manner described 
above, then wherever P exists, Q must also exist.  Moreover, P and Q must be organized 
in a certain way.  They are organized such that from that organization we could derive the 
spatiotemporal relation between them as being one moment apart.  Thus, our universe 
consists of two objects P and Q.  It spans two moments.  And P is temporally located at 
the first moment, while Q is temporally located at the second.   
                                                 
34 P and Q must both exist in the ontological sense.  They must both fall within the domain of our most 
unrestricted quantifiers.   
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If P and Q were temporal parts of the same object, then the causal analysis of 
temporal location above would explain what it was for that object to perdure through 
time.  An explanation of an object’s enduring through time would work similarly.   
Of course, to say that P shares a necessary causal connection with Q, while 
accurate, is not a full explanation of the connection between them.  I do not want it to be 
the case that every object that superficially resembles P is necessarily connected to every 
object that superficially resembles Q.   
Assume for the sake of simplicity that every object is merely a bundle of co-
instantiated properties.35  Some of an object’s properties will be accidental to it, while 
others of its properties will be essential to its being the kind of object it is.  Now, I claim 
that for an object P to cause an object Q is for P to share a necessary connection with Q.  
That is, P exists iff Q exists and, necessarily, where P and Q exist, P is arranged in a 
certain way relative to Q.  By this, I mean that P’s essential properties are such that, 
necessarily, they are co-instantiated iff there is also another bundle of co-instantiated 
essential properties Q.  Moreover, these two bundles of properties must be arranged in a 
certain way relative to one another.  P and Q’s arrangement supervenes on P and Q’s 
essential properties.  That is, the space-time points that constitute P and Q are organized 
in the way they are because of P and Q’s essential properties.  One cannot modify their 
arrangement without modifying their essential properties.    
                                                 
35 For a discussion of bundle theory, see James Van Cleve, “Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,” 
Philosophical Studies 47 (1985), 95-107. 
 
Gabriel, John J., 2007, UMSL, p. 32 
To illustrate, consider an object in space-time.  That is, consider the set of space-
time points that constitute an object, and consider the space-time points that surround it.  
The object causes space-time to curve.36   That is, the points that constitute the object 
have the property mass.  Wherever an object with that mass exists, it must exist in space-
time, and the space-time must have a certain curvature.  Again, that is, where a set of 
space-time points with mass are organized so as to constitute the object, there must be 
other space-time points arranged so as to surround them.  And these surrounding space-
time points must have the property of having a certain curvature.  This means, if an object 
exists with this mass, then it must exist in a curved space-time.  And it means if there is a 
space-time with this curvature, there must be in proximity an object with the requisite 
mass.37   
Mass is an essential property of the space-time points that constitute the object, 
and so it is relevant to how the object curves space-time.  Curvature is an essential 
property of space-time points surrounding the object, and so the curvature is relevant to 
the masses of the objects within it.38  But accidental properties, like the color of the 
                                                 
36 Jose Wudka, “The General Theory of Relativity,” 
<http://phyun5.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/Pdf_downloads/7.pdf>, 19. 
 
37 The fact that I focus on a gravitational example, i.e., mass causing a curve in space-time, to illustrate my 
characterization of causation should not lead the reader to assume that I take gravity as the only causal 
mechanism relevant to determining the organization of space-time.  Gravitational causal relations are just 
one of many types of causal relations necessary to arrange the points that comprise the universe into the 
proper manifold structure.  Consider again my question of why I am now in my office.  I answered that I 
am now in my office because my past part walked into my office.  The causal relation between my past part 
and my current part is certainly relevant to the organization of the space-time points that comprise me. 
 
38 I’m assuming here that curvature is an essential property of all space-time points, so curvature will also 
be an essential property of the points that constitute the object.  I trust science supports this assumption, but 
if science does not, this fact more reflects a poor choice of example on my part than a poor analysis of 
spatiotemporal location. 
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object, are irrelevant to how the object curves space and likewise irrelevant to the 
object’s spatiotemporal location. 
It may here be objected that causal relations can generally be construed in one of 
two ways:  1) The cause makes a differences as to whether the effect obtains.  2) The 
cause transfers energy to the effect.39  Which of these two ways of construing causation 
am I opting for in my discussion?  I opt for a difference-making account.  Consider again 
the above example.  The object’s having the mass that it does causes the space-time 
points around it to curve.  The curve in space-time is different as a result of the mass of 
the object.  The differences to the intrinsic properties of the effect as a result of the cause 
may be subtle, even imperceptibly so, but I maintain that, where an object is causally 
related to another, it makes a difference to the intrinsic properties of that other 
nonetheless.   
With the notion of a causal relation as described above at our disposal, we now 
return to our analysis of spatiotemporal location.  Recall that we can envision all of the 
space-time points in existence as beads.  Then, assuming that spatiotemporal location is 
primitive, we can envision the principle of organization that results as strings connecting 
the beads.  By pulling the strings tight, every space-time point in existence becomes 
properly arranged into a manifold.   
Now, we were trying to find a way of producing that same manifold arrangement 
without the aid of primitive spatiotemporal location, relying instead on causal relations.  
                                                 
39 See Jonathan Schaffer, “The Metaphysics of Causation,” < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-
metaphysics/>. 
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In terms of our simple two-object world, we were able to create the proper arrangement 
of P and Q by taking causation to be a kind of necessary connection, but what happens 
when we increase the complexity of the world? 
Imagine now that we have what the eternalist would tell us is the set of all the 
space-time points that exist in the actual world.  This means we’re taking existence in the 
broadest possible sense (the ontological sense) to be distinct from existence restricted to 
some subset of the points (the temporal-location sense).  This set of points shows no 
organization whatsoever.   
If we envision the space-time points again as beads, it is simply a disorganized 
mess of beads.  We must arrange the points into the proper manifold without reference to 
spatiotemporal location.  So, if we understand causation as described above and make a 
few additional assumptions, we can completely produce the proper manifold arrangement 
without relying on primitive spatiotemporal location.   
But what assumptions do we need to make this causal analysis of spatiotemporal 
location work?  First and most importantly, we need to know what causes what.  That is, 
we need to take the causal relations between space-time points as primitive modal facts.40  
Second, we need to assume that all causation proceeds in the same direction.  There is no 
backwards causation, or put better, the space-time points are organized in the direction of 
causation.   
                                                 
40 Or put better, we need primitive modality in that we cannot analyze the necessity of the connection 
between space-time points in terms of concrete possible worlds individuated by primitive spatiotemporal 
location.   
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With these assumptions in place, if the causal interaction between space-time 
points in the world is rich enough, then by relying on the causal relations between points, 
we can arrange our disorganized mess into the proper manifold structure.  The question 
then becomes whether the web of causation is rich enough to provide us with the proper 
manifold arrangement.   
In our discussion of the two-object, P-and-Q universe, we noted that, if P and Q 
were temporal parts of the same object, then we would know what it is for that object to 
perdure through time.  So if we chart the arrangement of the space-time points that make 
up the temporal parts of our P/Q object, we will have a sort of diagram of that object’s 
path through space-time, its worldline.  So returning to the complex actual universe, for 
all of the objects whose temporal parts are causally related, we can, in the same way we 
charted the worldline of our P/Q object, chart those object’s worldlines.  What we need, 
in order to produce the proper manifold structure, is sufficient causal connections 
between the different worldlines so that we can know how every worldline is arranged 
relative to every other.   
Now, our goal has been to devise an organizing principle for the points of space-
time so that we need not take spatiotemporal location as primitive.  We’ve latched onto 
causal relations as described above as the means to arrange the space-time points into the 
proper manifold structure.  We’ve noted that, for any objects whose temporal parts are 
causally related, the space-time points that constitute those parts will be causally related.  
And by charting the arrangement of these points, we can diagram these objects’ 
worldlines.  To connect these worldlines and thus to create the proper manifold structure, 
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we need causal relations between the space-time points that constitute the objects and the 
space-time points that surround them.   
The general theory of relativity provides us with an account of how the space-
time points that constitute objects with mass are causally connected to the unoccupied 
space-time points around them.  It also provides us with an account of how those 
unoccupied space-time points are causally connected to the objects they surround.  Put 
simply, the general theory of relativity (GTR) states, “The curvature of space…is 
generated by the mass of the bodies in it.  Correspondingly, the curvature of space 
determines the trajectories of all bodies moving in it.”41   
If this sketch of GTR is correct, then that will provide us with a means of 
connecting our disparate collection of worldlines.42  The objects with mass will cause 
changes in the surrounding space-time, and the curvature of space-time will cause 
changes in the objects within it.  Appealing again to GTR, “Matter tells space-time how 
to curve and space-time tells matter how to move.”43  It seems, according to GTR, there 
is sufficient causal interaction to connect all of the worldlines and thus to produce the 
proper manifold structure.  Causal interaction can serve as the organizing principle of 
space-time.   
 
                                                 
41 Wudka, “The General Theory of Relativity,” 24. 
 
42 If this sketch of GTR is incorrect, that does not itself demonstrate that causal relations do not/cannot 
serve as the organizing principle for our space-time points.  My hope is that science, as manifested by GTR, 
supports something like my proposal.  But if I have misconstrued GTR, that nonetheless leaves it open that 
science may still discover sufficient causal interaction so that causation may serve as the organizing 
principle of space-time. 
 
43 Ibid., 19. 
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BREAKING RANKS 
But what if the causal interactions were not so rich?  What if there were isolated 
worldlines or isolated clusters of worldlines?  Assume that ours is a world where the 
causal interactions are not sufficiently rich.  There are clusters of space-time points that 
are not causally related to one another.  And so, while we may have an organized 
manifold for each of our clusters, we have no way of knowing how these clusters fit 
together.   
There would be no way of distinguishing our world from a world containing two 
spatiotemporally disconnected space-times.  We cannot, as Lewis does, simply deny the 
possibility of spatiotemporally disconnected space-times within a world.44  Even if we 
denied it, that would tell us nothing about how our disconnected manifolds fit.  It would 
only tell us that they have to fit.   
Our best response is to simply admit what Lewis denies.  In a world where the 
causal interaction is impoverished enough to leave us with disconnected clusters of 
worldlines, we simply have a world with disconnected space-times.45  What we must 
deny is the possibility of a world in which the causal interactions leave us with 
disconnected manifolds but where those manifolds are still part of the same space-time. 
                                                 
44 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 71-72. 
 
45 Note that it isn’t essential to my view that we accept the possibility of disconnected space-times within a 
world.  I merely claim that, where the causal interaction within a world is not rich enough to provide us 
with one connected manifold, we have disconnected space-times within that world.  It is still open to us to 
claim that there is no world in which the causal interaction is insufficiently rich. 
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Is this denial problematic?  On the face of it, it certainly seems like we can 
imagine casually disconnected objects within the same space-time.  Imagine a world 
containing only two spheres.  These spheres are separated by an immeasurable distance in 
space, but nonetheless they are part of the same space-time.  Moreover, these spheres do 
not interact at all.  The state of the former sphere makes no difference to the state of the 
latter sphere.  Isn’t this an entirely possible state of affairs? 
I must maintain that it isn’t.  First, what would be the difference between these 
spheres being part of the same space-time and these spheres being part of two 
disconnected space-times?  One might reply that, in the former case, we could travel 
between the spheres if we were placed within that space, but in the latter case, we 
couldn’t.  But by this very reply, we begin inserting other objects (people, rocket ships, or 
whatever other paraphernalia we’d need to bridge the gap) into our space, and this would 
increase the amount of causal interaction in the world.  By the very circumstance we’d 
posit to show that the spheres were in one space, we might inadvertently posit sufficient 
causal interaction to connect the spheres into one manifold.   
Second, if these spheres are the same sort of objects that are in our world, then 
they are going to have mass.  And if the space in which these spheres are placed is the 
same sort of space-time that is in our world, then that space-time is going to curve.46  
Recalling GTR, it seems like the two depressions in space-time that result from the 
masses of the objects will make a difference to one another, even in a way that is hardly 
                                                 
46 Wudka, “The General Theory of Relativity,” 24. 
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perceivable.  If they were to interact in this way, then we would again have sufficient 
interaction to connect the spheres into one manifold. 
All of this is just another way of denying that the circumstance in which the 
causal interactions leave us with disconnected manifolds but where those manifolds are 
still part of the same space-time is possible.  But at least it should serve to make that 
denial seem more plausible.  Where we have insufficient causal interaction such that our 
picture of causal relations yields two disconnected manifolds of space-time points, we 
have two spatiotemporally disconnected space-times.  In a way, by accepting the 
possibility of disconnected space-times within a world but denying the possibility of 
disconnected causal manifolds within the same space-time, we have turned a seeming 
weakness into a strength.  Lewis grants that the possibility of disconnected space-times 
within a world is plausible.47  We have seen that the possibility of disconnected causal 
manifolds within a space-time isn’t. 
But with the very remarks I use to show that the denial of the possibility of 
disconnected causal manifolds within a space-time is plausible, I illustrate another 
objection to my view.  I have been claiming, hopefully bolstered by GTR, that the mass 
of an object causes a curve in space-time.  On my characterization of causation, that 
means that there is some necessary connection between mass and curvature.  But isn’t it 
possible that an object has mass without the space-time around it curving?  If I accept that 
the fact that an object’s mass causes space-time to curve is among our primitive modal 
facts, I must insist that it isn’t. 
                                                 
47 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 71. 
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Again, on the face of it, we can imagine a world in which there is a sphere with 
the same sort of mass that objects in our world have.  Yet we can also imagine that the 
space-time points that constitute that sphere are not surrounded by other space-time 
points, i.e. it is not in space-time, or it is in a space-time that does not curve.  Certainly, it 
seems like such a state of affairs is possible.  But, I have to deny this possibility.   
Should we be concerned about this?  Again, I maintain that we shouldn’t.  
Consider the circumstance in which a sphere with the same sort of mass that objects in 
our world have is in a space-time of the same sort as our space-time.  Nonetheless, this 
space-time does not curve.  I must refuse that this state of affairs is possible.  But I can 
accept the possibility of a sphere with a property very much like mass (fool’s mass or 
pseudo-mass) in a space-time that does not curve.  This space-time is not the sort of 
space-time as the one in our world either, but it too is very similar to our own.  I must 
claim that, when we envision the circumstance that I refuse and deem in possible, what 
we really envision is the circumstance that I accept.   
Yes, an object with mass could not exist outside of space-time nor could it exist in 
a non-curved space-time.  But an object with pseudo-mass could exist outside of space-
time, or an object with pseudo-mass could exist in a pseudo-space-time that was not 
curved.  Our powers to differentiate between mass and pseudo-mass might not be so well 
honed that we can deny the necessary connection between mass and curvature based on 
our ability to conceive of circumstances where this connection does not hold alone.   
Now, to talk about an object that is temporally located at a time t requires us to 
quantify over t.  On eternalism, we must restrict our quantifiers so that only a subset of all 
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the space-time points in existence falls within those quantifiers’ domain.  The question 
then becomes how we differentiate between those space-time points that fall within the 
domain of those restricted quantifiers from those space-time points that merely fall within 
the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers.  Put better, is there a principle of 
organization behind the space-time points in the universe such that we can appeal to it as 
a means of distinguishing the space-time points that comprise t from those that don’t.   
We suggested that the causal relations between space-time points may provide the 
principle by which we can arrange those points into the proper manifold structure.  But 
there are a handful of issues stemming from the means by which I described the proposal 
which bear addressing here.   
First, in my characterization of a causal relation, I noted that for, any two space-
time points P and Q, if P is causally related to Q, then necessarily P exists iff Q exists and 
necessarily, where P and Q exist, P is arranged in a certain way relative to Q.  Now, it 
may sound, when I say that P is arranged in a certain way relative to Q, as if I am trying 
to place space-time points P and Q within some other space-time manifold.  Moreover, 
when I appeal to the certain arrangement P bears to Q, it sounds like I’m appealing to 
some kind of primitive spatiotemporal relation. 
But this is not so much a problem for my view as it is an artifact of the method I 
used to describe it.  It helps us understand the project if we visualize P and Q as beads 
and the causal connection between them as some kind of tether; that is, if we spatialize 
the principle of organization between them.  But when we talk about the principle of 
organization between space-time points P and Q, we’re not truly trying to arrange them 
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within some other space-time manifold.  There is no other manifold that undergirds the 
space-time points.  All there is is space-time points.   That is, I’m taking the universe to 
be comprised of the space-time points and nothing more.48   
Moreover, the arrangement between the points is simply a means of articulating 
the principle of organization between them.  It is not a spatiotemporal relation.  
Spatiotemporal relations arise from the principle of organization between the space-time 
points, and the principle of organization is nothing but the causal connections between 
the points. 
Second, in trying to discover the principle of organization behind the space-time 
points, I seemed to assume that every space-time point was a mereological simple.  For 
any space-time point, it’s impossible to divide that point into smaller points.  This may or 
may not be a fair assumption, but it is one we do not need to make. 
Imagine that for any space-time point, we can divide that point into a collection of 
smaller points.  Imagine space-time is gunky.  Much as the larger points with which we 
started participate in causal relations that organize them, so too will the smaller points 
participate in causal relations that organize them.  The same way that causal relations can 
serve as the principle of organization behind mereological simple space-time points, they 
can also serve as the principle of organization behind gunky space-time points. 
Finally, there is a question of how we determine what constitutes a moment on 
my view.  Presuming eternalism, we said that a moment t is a subset of all the space-time 
                                                 
48 Recall that I am not attempting to analyze space and time itself.  I am attempting to analyze 
spatiotemporal location.  I take the existence of space-time points to be primitive the same way I take the 
existence of the objects that the space-time points comprise to be primitive.   
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points that exist simpliciter.  Granting that causal relations serve as the principle of 
organization that arranges the space-time points, we can appeal to this organization in 
differentiating which points are members of the subset and which points are not.  If we 
spatialize the organization between the points again, there is a question of how thick a 
time-slice of points constitutes a moment.  Is a moment only one space-time point thick, 
or is it more than one space-time point thick?   
I take this to be a separate philosophical issue from the one that forms the core of 
this paper.  But if space-time is gunky, obviously moments will be infinitely many points 
thick.  If space-time is atomic, then moments may be only one point thick.  I take it to be 
really a question of how many points we want to quantify over when we talk about a 
moment.  And that is a separate question from how the space-time points are arranged.  
No matter how we decide the issue of what constitutes a moment, we will be able to 
appeal to the principle of organization behind the space-time points in order to determine 
what points are local to that moment and what points are not. 
   
ORGANIZATION UNMOTIVATED 
Of course, there is major objection waiting in the wings.  Why bother to discover 
an organizing principle between the space-time points at all?  Claiming that the 
organization between them is primitive has its advantages.  Moreover, grounding the 
organization between space-time points in terms of causal relations has its disadvantages.  
Even if my view is coherent, perhaps it is unmotivated.   
Gabriel, John J., 2007, UMSL, p. 44 
Consider the analysis of causation that arises from Humean reductionism.  
According to Humeanism, modal facts supervene on non-modal facts. 49   That is, facts 
like the laws of nature and the counterfactual structure of the world supervene on facts 
about the distribution of perfectly natural properties within the world.50 
We take the distribution of these properties to be primitive.  We take as given the 
“pattern of instantiation of space-time points of perfectly natural monadic properties, 
together with the facts about the spatiotemporal relations among those points.”51  From 
this distribution, we posit the system of natural laws that provides us with the simplest 
and yet most informative representation of the regularities within that distribution.52  
Then, from this set of natural laws and the distribution, we fix the counterfactual structure 
of the world, thus fixing what causes what.53 
In essence, we reason from the primitive spatiotemporal location of the space-
time points to the causal relations between them.  Now, I have been arguing that we 
should proceed in the other direction.  We should reason from the causal relations 
between space-time points to their spatiotemporal locations.   
On first blush, there seems to be no reason why it should be any worse to infer in 
the direction I prefer instead of in the direction the Humean prefers.  But the Humean will 
                                                 
49 Ned Hall, “Humean Reductionism About Laws of Nature,” paper presented to the Arizona Ontology 
Conference, Tucson, AZ, January 2007, 4. 
 
50 Ibid., 6. 
 
51 Ibid., 5. 
 
52 Ibid., 12. 
 
53 Ibid., 2. 
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note that we have epistemic access to the distribution of space-time points.  We can look 
and feel and perform experiments to determine the position of objects in space-time.  So I 
will have to agree with the Humean that we must discover the laws (and thus what causes 
what) via looking at the patterns in the distribution of space-time points.  The Humean is 
simply taking our agreed upon epistemic standards and elevating them to the 
metaphysical standards by which we constitute the laws of nature.54 
So, I’m already giving ground to the Humean in that I must assent to learning the 
laws of nature in his way.  Isn’t it epistemically responsible of me then to grant that laws 
of nature are constituted in his way?  Moreover, in characterizing the causal relations 
between space-time points, I described them as a necessary connection between points.  
The phrase “necessary connection” doesn’t exactly have a positive connotation in 
philosophy.   Lewis describes such necessary connections as “magical,” and he doesn’t 
mean it in a good way.55 
What’s more, Lewis needs primitive spatiotemporal location to play a role in his 
genuine modal realism.  The asset of genuine modal realism is that it allows us to analyze 
modality.  On genuine modal realism, modality becomes quantification.56  We do not 
need to rely on primitive modal operators.   
In order for my analysis of spatiotemporal location to succeed, I must rely on 
primitive modality.  Genuine modal realism is incompatible with my analysis of 
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55 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 191. 
 
56 Ibid., 5. 
 
Gabriel, John J., 2007, UMSL, p. 46 
spatiotemporal location.  Genuine modal realism, as Lewis describes it, assumes as 
primitive concrete worlds much like ours, where spatiotemporal location is simply 
assumed as primitive.   
Not only does Lewis assume primitive spatiotemporal location, he also relies on it 
to individuate worlds.  Lewis says, “A world is a mereological sum of all the possible 
individuals that are parts of it, and so are worldmates of one another.”57  And Lewis also 
says, “[F]or any two possible individuals, if every particular part of one is 
spatiotemporally related to every particular part of the other that is wholly distinct from 
it, then the two are worldmates.”58  If he did not appeal to the spatiotemporal relations 
between objects, Lewis would be forced to posit a primitive worldmate relation. 
Since we look for our theories to posit as few primitives as possible, it seems that 
my treatment of spatiotemporal location is at a decisive disadvantage.  I am forced to 
appeal to primitive modality and a primitive account of what causes what in order to 
provide an analysis of spatiotemporal location.59  The Humean genuine modal realist 
needs only appeal to primitive spatiotemporal location in order to analyze modality, laws 
of nature, and causation.  If we were to do a cost/benefit analysis of the two views, it 
seems that mine would offer a smaller return of philosophical utility for a larger 
investment in commitment to primitives.  My view seems unmotivated. 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 69. 
 
58 Ibid., 70. 
 
59 To be perfectly accurate, since I’ve analyzed causal claims as modal claims, I only really need primitive 
modality.  But it’s important to note that causal connections, as I’ve characterized them, are necessary 
connections. 
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Moreover, it won’t do to defend my view to claim that it will at least allow the 
eternalist to maintain the economy of primitives that motivated his view over presentism.  
It may be true that the eternalist must make a distinction between existence in the 
ontological sense and existence in the temporal-location sense.  It may be true that the 
presentist need not make this distinction.  And it may be true that analyzing 
spatiotemporal location as I’ve proposed allows the eternalist to make sense of the 
distinction between the ontological and temporal-location senses of existence without 
resorting to primitive spatiotemporal location.  But simply because the presentist did not 
need to make the distinction does not leave the presentist unscathed by the puzzle of 
analyzing location. 
Recall that, as much as the eternalist has the problem of analyzing temporal 
location, the presentist has the problem of analyzing spatial location.  So if the presentist 
must posit spatial location as among his primitives, he can hardly begrudge the eternalist 
from positing spatiotemporal location among his primitives.  Appealing to my view as a 
means to advance the debate between presentism and eternalism alone fails to motivate it. 
To make a case for my view in the face of the challenge from Humeanism and 
genuine modal realism, let’s start by considering Humeanism.  First, I must grant that that 
Humean is right about how we should come to learn the laws of nature and thus what 
causes what.60  We must start by investigating those facets of the world to which we have 
                                                 
60 I must grant that the Humean has the correct epistemic standards, but I can kvetch that the Humean has 
no more access to the distribution of natural properties and spatiotemporal relations among space-time 
points across all times (he only has access to a fraction of times) than I have to the connection between 
space-time points across worlds.   
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access, namely the arrangement of space-time points and the distribution of properties 
within them.   
Yes, investigating the laws of nature in this way is epistemically responsible.  But 
is elevating our epistemic standards to the standards that constitute a law metaphysically 
responsible?  The Humean objects that there is something magical about the notion that 
objects or events share a necessary connection.  It’s much more reasonable to accept that 
the disconnected space-time points simply have some distribution.  And from the patterns 
and regularities that occur within that distribution, we then infer generalizations about the 
natural laws and about what causes what. 
But isn’t it equally magical to assume that there is no analyzable principle of 
organization behind the distribution and yet there are discernable patterns and regularities 
within it.  What is more unreasonable:  1) That certain events are connected and that that 
connection explains why they occur in a patterned way, or 2) That events occur in a 
patterned way and that that pattern allows us to posit a connection between them? 
Metaphysically speaking, there seems to be no reason to prefer the latter to the 
former.  Yes, it is fishy if we posit some unexplainable connection between events, but 
it’s equally fishy if we posit some unexplainable pattern in the distribution of events.  It 
seems that in the question of whether the Humean’s view is preferable to my own, we 
have reached a stalemate.   
The issue then turns on genuine modal realism.  As we noted earlier, my proposal 
for analyzing spatiotemporal location and genuine modal realism are incompatible.  We 
cannot analyze spatiotemporal location in terms of necessary causal connection if we 
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analyze necessary causal connection in terms of spatiotemporal location.  If we accept 
genuine modal realism as an analysis of modality, we cannot accept causation as the 
principle of organization between our space-time points.  The question then becomes 
whether we should accept genuine modal realism. 
Recall that genuine modal realism is the competitor to actualism.  Actualism is the 
view that, necessarily, there are no non-actual objects.61  That is, the only objects in 
existence are the objects in the actual world.  Genuine modal realism is the view that, 
necessarily, there are some non-actual objects.62  That is, there are other objects in 
existence than just those in the actual world, and those existent but merely possible 
objects make up a plenitude of existent but merely possible worlds. 
All these merely possible objects and merely possible worlds go a long way 
toward padding the totality of objects in existence.  And it is this expansive ontology that 
has made genuine modal realism seem problematic.  Most philosophers have taken these 
ontological commitments to be too great a cost and have thus opted for some form of 
actualism. 
Among actualists, there are those who simply take modality as primitive and 
those who try to analyze modality via abstract possible worlds.  Unlike the possible 
worlds posited by the genuine modal realist, abstract possible worlds are not of the same 
kind as the actual world.  They are abstract representations of how other worlds might be.  
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 Lewis distinguishes between three ways in which abstract possible worlds might 
represent possible states of affairs:  1) Linguistic, on which abstract worlds represent via 
the meanings of words of which they are constructed.  2) Pictorial, on which abstract 
worlds are like pictures that represent by isomorphism.  3) Magical, on which abstract 
worlds simply represent as part of their nature.63  Lewis proceeds to show that each of 
these ways still commits one to primitive modality.64  So in essence, the debate between 
actualism and genuine modal realism is the debate between whether we can/should 
analyze modality or whether we must/should take it as primitive.   
Lewis takes his genuine modal realism to provide an analysis of modality.  
According to Lewis, if we accept the genuine modal realist’s program, we can analyze all 
modal statements by quantifying over possible worlds.  Is Lewis right about this?  To see, 
we need to examine his definition of a possible world. 
According to genuine modal realism, a possible world is “a mereological sum of 
all the possible individuals that are parts of it, and so are worldmates of one another.”65  
The possible individuals are the parts that together comprise the whole mereological sum.  
But “the part-whole relation [of a mereological sum] is analogous to the member-set 
relation in the following ways: wholes are individuated by their parts; they necessarily 
exist if their parts do; and they have whatever parts they do essentially.”66  This constraint 
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means that every world exists iff its parts do.  And it means that every object must have 
its worldmates essentially.  Now, on genuine modal realism’s analysis of modality, it is 
not the case that every object has its worldmates essentially.   
Consider that Sider and I are worldmates in the actual world.  Every part of Sider 
and I are spatiotemporally related to one another.  Is it possible, according to genuine 
modal realism, that Sider and I are not worldmates?  Yes.  It’s possible that Sider and I 
are not worldmates if the following condition is met:  There is a world that contains a 
counterpart of Sider, but it does not contain a counterpart of me.  Certainly, the genuine 
modal realist must grant that this condition is met.  I am obviously a contingent being, 
and Sider can obviously exist independently of whether I exist.   
How then is the genuine modal realist to reconcile his analysis of modality with 
its failure to uphold the requirement that the possible worlds have their parts essentially?  
He can deny that there is some other possible world in which Sider exists but I don’t.  
This is hardly an appealing option.  Or, despite his analysis of most modal claims, he can 
simply posit a sui generis law stating that every possible world must have exactly the 
parts that it has.67  But by positing this law, the genuine modal realist resorts to primitive 
modality.   
By positing this law, the genuine modal realist asserts that, necessarily, every 
object has exactly the worldmates that it does.  But the genuine modal realist cannot 
analyze “necessarily” here as his treatment of modality suggests.  He cannot because, for 
                                                 
67 Yes, the law I insist that the genuine modal realist must posit is already an axiom of set theory.  But since 
it is an axiom of set theory, the genuine modal realist’s analysis of modality must uphold its truth.   
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any two contingent objects that are worldmates, the former will have a counterpart that is 
not spatiotemporally related to any of the latter’s counterparts.68  The genuine modal 
realist’s analysis of modality would not uphold the truth of the claim that every object has 
its worldmates essentially.  Thus, in order to uphold the truth of this claim, the genuine 
modal realist must resort to primitive modality.  On the face of it, it seems the genuine 
modal realist doesn’t really analyze modality after all. 
Now, I’ve mounted this attack on genuine modal realism in order to motivate my 
analysis of spatiotemporal location.  Recall that genuine modal realism takes 
spatiotemporal location as primitive, both as a means to individuate worlds and as a 
means to analyze modal claims.  I resort to primitive modality to analyze spatiotemporal 
location in terms of necessary causal connection between space-time points.   
The question becomes, if the genuine modal realist cedes that there is primitive 
modality in order to answer my objection, is his view still motivated over my own?  I 
claim that it isn’t.  For the genuine modal realist, taking spatiotemporal location as 
primitive seemed motivated by the fact that doing so allowed one to analyze modality.  
But if the genuine modal realist must subscribe to primitive modality, his view begins to 
seem unmotivated.  By taking modality as primitive, I can analyze spatiotemporal 
location.  By taking spatiotemporal location as primitive, he cannot analyze modality.   
Moreover, even were my argument against genuine modal realism to fail, there is 
still the problem of the genuine modal realist’s ontological commitments.  As Lewis 
argued, if one is to be an actualist of any stripe, he will have to accept primitive modality.  
                                                 
68 I’m assuming here that the two contingent objects are such that one can exist independently of the other.   
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Thus, if one rejects genuine modal realism because of its expansive ontology, one must 
bring onboard primitive modality.  And it is in primitive modality that my analysis of 
spatiotemporal location has root. 
So recall the challenge from Humeanism and genuine modal realism.  My 
analysis of spatiotemporal location seems unmotivated because, by positing primitive 
spatiotemporal location, we can analyze both causation and modality.  I have shown that 
Humeanism and my analysis of spatiotemporal location are on equal footing.  I am able 
to explain why there is a pattern to the arrangement of space-time points at the expense of 
not analyzing causation.69  He is able to explain causation at the expense of not analyzing 
why there is a pattern to the arrangement of space-time points.   
I have also shown that genuine modal realism is at a disadvantage against my 
analysis of spatiotemporal location.  The genuine modal realist must accept an expansive 
ontology and primitive spatiotemporal location.  Moreover, it’s questionable whether his 
view really provides an analysis of modality.  I must merely accept primitive modality.  
An analysis of spatiotemporal location follows from there.  It seems my view is 
motivated after all.   
 
FINAL REMARKS 
So to recap, the presentist claims that it is always the case that there are no non-
present objects.70  The eternalist claims that it is always the case that there are some non-
                                                 
69 Or put better, at the expense of not analyzing modality. 
 
70 Markosian, “The 3D/4D Controversy,” 3. 
 
Gabriel, John J., 2007, UMSL, p. 54 
present objects.71  In fact, every object that has existed or will ever exist exists right now.  
Time is spread out into a manifold with all the different objects and events arranged 
within it. 
Because the eternalist claims that time is extended, he is forced to make a 
distinction the presentist needs not.  The eternalist must claim that for an object to be 
temporally located at a moment is something beyond that object’s merely falling within 
the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers at that moment.  Making this distinction 
demands that the eternalist explain what it is about the objects that are temporally located 
at a moment t that differentiates them from those objects that merely exist at that 
moment.  The eternalist must provide an analysis of temporal location. 
However, despite the fact that the presentist does not need to distinguish between 
existence at a time and existence simpliciter, the presentist is not spared from the 
challenge of analyzing location.  The presentist accepts that to exist at a particular region 
of space is not the same as existence simpliciter.  Thus, the presentist must provide an 
analysis of spatial location.   
On the face of it, there is neither an obvious way of analyzing temporal location 
nor an obvious way of analyzing spatial location.  So both the presentist and the eternalist 
might agree that spatiotemporal location is primitive and leave it at that.  But as we try to 
do with as few primitives as possible, we should offer an analysis of spatiotemporal 
location if we are able.   
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Our starting point for an analysis of spatiotemporal location is determining what 
we mean when we claim that an object is temporally located at a moment.  When we say 
that an object is temporally located at a moment t, we claim that there is a subset of all 
the space-time points that exist simpliciter that we call t and that some of the space-time 
points within that subset constitute the object.  The question then becomes how we 
differentiate between the space-time points that are members of the subset t and the 
space-time points that are not.   
Differentiating between the points that are members of t and the points that are 
not requires us to appeal to the organizing principle behind the manifold arrangement of 
space-time points.  When we claim that spatiotemporal location is primitive, we take the 
principle of organization between the space-time points as unexplainable.  To analyze 
spatiotemporal location, we must devise a principle of organization between the space-
time points. 
We posit causation as the organizing principle behind the arrangement of space-
time points.  We understand causation as a necessary connection between space-time 
points.  That is, if a point P causes a point Q, then necessarily, P exists iff Q exists, and 
necessarily, where P and Q exist, P is arranged in a certain way relative to Q.  If points P 
and Q are temporal parts of the same object, then via our conception of causation, we 
know what it is for P/Q to perdure through time.   
Thus, insofar as an object’s past temporal parts are causally related to its 
succeeding temporal parts, then via our conception of causation, we know what it is for a 
complex object to perdure through time.  This principle by which we organize the space-
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time points that constitute an object, allows us to chart the worldline of that object.  In the 
same way then, we can chart the worldline of every object. 
The issue then lies with connecting the worldlines to the points that do not 
instantiate objects so that our space-time points have the proper manifold arrangement.  
We saw, via the general theory of relativity, that the space-time points constituting 
objects with mass are causally connected to the space-time points that surround them.  
Thus, there are sufficient causal connections within our world to arrange the space-time 
points within it into the proper manifold structure. 
This shows that causation, as I’ve characterized it, is a coherent account of the 
principle of organization between the space-time points within our world.  Moreover, 
objections that my characterization of causation rules out manifestly possible 
circumstances and that my view is unmotivated by the tenets of Humeanism and genuine 
modal realism were shown to fail.  Thus, we can appeal to my characterization of 
causation as an analysis of spatiotemporal location.   
So far, we’ve shown that causation can serve as the organizing principle between 
space-time points.  In our proposal, we’ve assumed the space-time points in our world fit 
the eternalist’s conception of an extended time.  Thus, the eternalist can appeal to our 
proposal in distinguishing those objects that are temporally located at a moment t from 
those objects that merely exist at that moment without expanding his commitment to 
primitives.  
The question now becomes whether the presentist can appeal to a similar causal 
account in order to analyze spatial location.  This issue hinges on what is called the 
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problem of cross-time relations.  It is generally accepted that the relata that participate in 
a relation must both exist.  Thus, if presentism demands that the totality of existence is 
only one space-time point thick, then the presentist cannot appeal to causal relations as a 
means to organize space.   
But even bearing this point in mind, the presentist, on the face of it, may still 
appeal to something like my causal-relations analysis to analyze spatial location in one of 
two ways:  1) He could argue that the existence of the relata is not a necessary condition 
on their participating in a relation.  Then, he could appeal to tensed causal relations as a 
way of specifying the organizing principle behind the arrangement of the points.  2) He 
could accept that the present moment is more than one space-time point thick.  Either, the 
present moment has a thickness of multiple atomic space-time points, or space-time 
points are gunky.  Then, he could appeal to causal relations between these points in order 
to give the same analysis of spatiotemporal location that we provided the eternalist but on 
a smaller scale. 
Of course, the nuts and bolts of how the presentist would propose to reconcile his 
view with my analysis of spatiotemporal location would still need to be worked out.  
While my proposal was primarily designed to appeal to eternalists, there may be refuge in 
my analysis of spatiotemporal location for the presentist as well.  But the details of 
whether the presentist can appeal to something like my analysis of spatiotemporal 
location in order to analyze spatial location is a question for another time. 
 
Gabriel, John J., 2007, UMSL, p. 58 
 
 
WORKS CITED 
Hall, Ned, “Humean Reductionism About Laws of Nature,” paper presented to the 
Arizona Ontology Conference, Tucson, AZ, January 2007. 
Lewis, David, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford:  Blackwell, 1986). 
Markosian, Ned, “A Defense of Presentism,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, ed. Dean 
W. Zimmerman, vol. 1 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 47-82. 
Markosian, Ned, “The 3D/4D Controversy and Non-present Objects,” Philosophical 
Papers 23 (1994):  243-249. 
Savitt, Steven F., “Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective,” paper presented to the 
Philosophy of Time Society Meeting, Chicago, IL, March 2004. 
Schaffer, Jonathan, “The Metaphysics of Causation,” 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/>. 
Sider, Theodore, “Four Dimensionalism,” The Philosophical Review 106 (1997):  197-
231. 
Sider, Theodore, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment,” The Journal of Philosophy 
96 (1999):  325-347. 
Sider, Theodore, “Temporal Parts,” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, ed. John 
Hawthorne et al. (Oxford:  Blackwell, Forthcoming). 
Van Cleve, James, “Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,” Philosophical Studies 47 
(1985), 95-107. 
Gabriel, John J., 2007, UMSL, p. 59 
Wudka, Jose, “The General Theory of Relativity,” 
<http://phyun5.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/Pdf_downloads/7.pdf>. 
